The Michigan Historical Residential Foreclosure Data Project

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The Michigan Historical Residential Foreclosure Data Project

About Us

The Michigan Foreclosure Task Force (MFTF) was launched in 2007 by the Community Economic Development Association of Michigan (CEDAM) and stakeholders in banking, real estate, government, housing counseling, legal services and statewide advocacy groups. MFTF serves as a clearing house for foreclosure-related information and provides a unified voice to respond to Michigan’s foreclosure crisis. The MFTF is focused on reducing the number of foreclosures, keeping families, including homeowners and renters, in their homes and softening the impact of foreclosures on families, neighborhoods and communities. The MFTF does this by:

1. Serving as an information hub for housing counselors, consumer advocates, legislators, homeowners, and renters for timely, reliable foreclosure-related information;
2. Advocating for policy changes for stronger consumer protection and foreclosure mitigation laws; and
3. Helping nonprofit counseling agencies build capacity to better serve clients and meet the needs of the communities in which they serve.

Since its inception, the MFTF has grown to a broad-based coalition of more than 475 individuals representing 180 organizations across the state. Members include certified, nonprofit housing counseling agencies, legal service providers, community development organizations, state and local government agencies and officials, lenders, private sector partners, and individuals who are committed to protecting consumers and helping distressed communities.

By creating and leveraging resources and advocating for proactive policies and programs, the MFTF seeks to reduce the number of foreclosures and revitalize communities. During the past four years, the MFTF has served as the catalyst for the development of a network that ties together statewide, regional and local information, resources, best practices and partnerships that have enabled Michigan residents, neighborhoods and communities to more effectively respond to the foreclosure crisis in our own back yard.

About the Project

The Michigan Historical Residential Foreclosure Data Project is a partnership between The Michigan Foreclosure Task Force (MFTF), The Community Economic Development Association of Michigan (CEDAM), the Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA) and Grand Valley State University’s Community Research Institute (CRI). The project is made possible through a generous grant from Quicken Loans. The purpose of the effort is to provide communities throughout the state of Michigan with meaningful historical residential foreclosure-related data that gives them a clear picture of the genesis of the crisis and its impact over time both at the state and county level. Indicators and trends on residential foreclosures, delinquency, Real Estate Owned (REO) properties and proxies for estimating time properties remain in foreclosure and underwater homes are provided for each county where available. The project also explores the trends between urban and rural counties in Michigan. It is our hope that communities will use this data to launch or enhance local foreclosure response efforts. To view historical residential foreclosure data for each county in Michigan please go to http://cridata.org/michiganforeclosuretaskforce.

About the Data

This report combines data from multiple sources. Our primary source for loan performance information is First American CoreLogic’s Market Trends data set for zip codes and counties in Michigan. This data set represents approximately 85 percent of all outstanding mortgage loans and provides information on home sales, delinquency and foreclosure fillings. However, it contains data for only 65 to 70 percent of total sales market for median price and number of sales. Other data sources used are the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Decennial Census Summary File 1 for vacancies, Case-Schiller and Isely for housing price indexes in Detroit and Grand Rapids respectively, and Michigan Department of Treasury for State Equalized Values.
• Phase one of Michigan’s foreclosure crisis occurred during 2005 to 2008. This phase is characterized by attrition caused by unemployment rates near seven percent continuous from 2003 on top of rapid growth of subprime lending, predatory lending, and use of exotic mortgage products.

• Phase two of the foreclosure crisis occurred during 2008 to 2010, and is characterized by the credit crisis and near collapse of the auto industry.

• The foreclosure surge in phase two correlated with homeowners residing along the interstate highway system used by auto suppliers.

• A total of $63 billion of Michigan's housing value was lost between 2006 and 2010. This is around 20 percent of the housing value that existed in 2006.

• The drop in housing value in Detroit and Grand Rapids was even larger with decreases over 40 percent.

• The number of vacant houses in Michigan increased by 211,107 between the 2000 census and the 2010 census – an increase of 47.1 percent.

• Between 2005 and 2010, 416,116 residential units across Michigan faced a foreclosure auction filing (the traditional start of a foreclosure). This represents nine percent of the housing stock in 2010. Only 227,060 of these completed an REO sale (the traditional end of a foreclosure) leaving a large stock of unsold homes.

• During these six years, 11 of the 30 counties that report median Loan to Value ratios had more than 50 percent of loans underwater during at least one month.

• In rural areas, the average monthly foreclosure rate tripled between 2005 and 2010.

• In 2008, the number of auction filings was greater than the number of sales tracked by First American Core Logic.

• In 2009, the number of REO sales was 90 percent of the total house sales tracked by First American Core Logic.

Foreclosure Trends

In 2005, despite Michigan’s continuing high unemployment rate (6.8 vs. 5.1 percent nationally), few foresaw the coming foreclosure crisis that would evolve over the next five years. At this point, only three counties (Wayne, Osceola, and Oscoda) had average monthly percentages of loans in foreclosure above one percent, and each county was above Michigan’s unemployment rate. The rest of the state saw virtually no sign of a problem. The monthly percentage of loans in foreclosure for the remaining 80 counties averaged only 0.54 percent. Only 13 of those counties had monthly foreclosure percentages above 0.75 percent. The general trend can be followed in Graphs 1, 2, and 3 (on pages 5 and 6) and in the Foreclosure and Delinquency Maps (Maps 1-12). Graphs 2 and 3 show the median, maximum, and minimum for the 83 counties in Michigan.

Heading into 2006, nationally, the foreclosure crisis was primed from a combination of subprime lending, predatory lending, unintended consequences of government policies to encourage home ownership, and eventually falling home values and credit restrictions. The result was homeowners with little equity and no cushion for loss of income. These homeowners often were also relying on increases in housing values to facilitate refinancing the loan at better terms prior to a balloon payment. Unfortunately, in Michigan, high unemployment beginning in 2003 that stayed high continuously through the next recession exposed the weaknesses of these mortgage policies before it became apparent in much of the country. Across the state, the years of above average unemployment combined with subprime lending started to take its toll as there was a 22 percent increase in the average monthly rate of loans.
Foreclosure Trends

at least 90 days late for the median county. This was accompanied by a nine percent increase in the average monthly percentages of loans in foreclosure for the median county. In the worst county, Wayne, there was a 24 percent increase in the average monthly percentage of loans in foreclosure and 7.3 percent of loans were at least 90 days late in an average month.

The number of foreclosures continued to grow throughout 2007. The median county in Michigan saw its average monthly percentage of loans in foreclosure increase by 23 percent and the average monthly rate of loans 90 days late increase by 29 percent. Wayne County continued to lead the way and averaged more than 1.9 percent of loans in foreclosure each month. In addition, the number of counties with average monthly loans in foreclosure above one percent increased to 12 counties.

For most of 2008, the cumulative effect of an unemployment rate sticking tenaciously close to seven percent since 2003, was the driving force behind foreclosures. In addition, the credit market started to seize up as the magnitude of collateralized debt problems (mostly linked to mortgages) was realized. The end of this first phase of the foreclosure buildup in Michigan came abruptly on September 14, 2008 when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. By the end of that week, the world’s economies had changed forever. Over the year, total foreclosure auction filings affected two percent of the housing stock.

Between 2008 and 2009, auto sales dropped 40 percent. Chrysler and GM entered bankruptcy and housing values dropped by 27 percent in Detroit and 30 percent in Grand Rapids. The unemployment rate increased from 8.3 to 13.3 percent in Michigan. Finally, the financial crisis made it nearly impossible for people to refinance loans before an interest rate reset, which was common in subprime and predatory loans, with the favorable terms seen early in the crisis. This combination of events in the face of already stressed Michigan homeowners increased the number of homes in the foreclosure process. The average monthly percentage of loans in foreclosure increased to 1.3 percent with the rate in Wayne County at 3.5 percent. Overall during 2009, nine out of ten sales tracked by First American Core Logic were REO sales. The areas around the I-96, I-94, and I-75 corridors bore the brunt of the increases in foreclosure rates because suppliers to the auto industry were based around these interstates to allow movement of parts between factories.

By 2010, virtually all counties in the entire lower peninsula had average monthly loans in foreclosure above 1.5 percent and 35 counties were above two percent.

By 2010, virtually all counties in the entire lower peninsula had average monthly loans in foreclosure above 1.5 percent and 35 counties were above two percent. The six years of the foreclosure crisis from 2005 – 2010 took a toll on homeowners in Michigan. An analysis of state-equalized values for housing shows that Michigan lost 63 billion dollars in residential housing value between 2006 and 2010. The biggest loss of value centered on Wayne County and the magnitude of loss generally drops with distance from the county (refer to Map 13). In addition, the rural northern counties without shoreline on one of the great lakes also saw large decreases in value. Interestingly, counties that are closely linked with Chicago in the southwest part of the state saw increases in housing values. This was also true for counties such as Leelanau that are popular locations for vacation homes for Chicagoans. The Upper Peninsula also generally saw increases in state equalized value, which is consistent with the far lower foreclosure rates seen in those counties.

1 Delinquency is defined as being more than 90 days late on your loan.

2 Automobile sales from Supplemental Estimates - Motor Vehicles, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), United States Department of Commerce, and house price change from Case-Schiller index for Detroit and Paul Isely for Grand Rapids.
Finally, there were large changes in the vacancy rate for residential homes across Michigan (refer to Map 14). Overall, there were 211,107 additional vacant houses in 2010 compared to 2000. The entire lower half of the Lower Peninsula had increases in vacancy rates above 25 percent. Many counties near Kent County or Wayne County had vacancy rate increases above 75 percent. These vacant homes will have a lasting effect on the overall housing market in Michigan for years to come.

These vacant homes will have a lasting effect on the overall housing market in Michigan for years to come.

3 Housing units vacancy numbers from the 2010 and 2000 U.S. Decennial Census Summary File 1.
Time in Foreclosure

Although there are other paths, generally a house enters the foreclosure process through an auction filing and exits the process with a REO sale. Therefore, to find a proxy for the average number of months a house will take to exit foreclosure, the number of REO sales can be divided by the number of houses in foreclosure. This is much like the absorption rate used to measure how long the current supply of houses on the market would last at the current sales rate. Based on this process, the time in foreclosure ranged from seven to 91 months in the last quarter of 2010. Of course, every month more houses enter foreclosure; therefore, if the number of houses entering foreclosure is greater than the number of REO sales, then the stock of foreclosed houses will grow and the months necessary to clear these houses will increase.

Every county shows distinct changes in the stock of foreclosed homes as well as REO sales (and hence time in foreclosure) between 2005 and 2010 based on local conditions. The data to explore these trends over a 6 year period exists for only 29 counties in the Lower Peninsula. Graphs 4, 5, and 6 (on page 7) show this for Kent, Wayne and Ionia counties. These counties represent both large urban and more rural housing markets. Wayne and Kent had more than 1,000 foreclosed properties, whereas Ionia had only a few hundred. The two phases of the foreclosure crisis can clearly be seen in each of the graphs. A slow steady build in foreclosed properties shows from 2005 through 2008, then the weight of homes in foreclosure started to overwhelm REO sales in late 2008, which resulted in an increase in the stock of homes in foreclosure.

What can be seen in both Kent and Wayne counties is that before the end of 2008 REO sales started to rise, such that the stock of foreclosed homes actually decreased through the first eight months of 2008. Then, REO sales slowed and foreclosures stayed high resulting in a surge in houses in the process of foreclosure. After the surge, the stock of foreclosed homes generally stabilized by the middle of 2009. In other words, houses were entering and exiting the market at about the same rate. These two markets stabilized as a result of the ability to sell larger blocks of houses to investors and a well-developed market for REO sales.

Ionia, on the other hand, also saw the same trends prior to the second foreclosure phase seen in Kent and Wayne. However, after the surge in foreclosures at the end of 2008, Ionia never stabilized and the stock of foreclosed homes continued to rise, leading to a large increase in the time in foreclosure. This much smaller market did not have the ability to absorb the foreclosed houses, as there were not large blocks of houses to sell to investors. Because of the relatively small number of foreclosed houses the market for REO sales is not as efficient compared to the larger markets.
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**GRAPH 4**
HOMES IN FORECLOSURE AND HOMES EXITING FORECLOSURE VIA REO SALES IN KENT COUNTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FORECLOSURES</th>
<th>REO SALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRAPH 5**
HOMES IN FORECLOSURE AND HOMES EXITING FORECLOSURE VIA REO SALES IN WAYNE COUNTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FORECLOSURES</th>
<th>REO SALES</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,805</td>
<td>440</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4,999</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5,503</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,993</td>
<td>1,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8,947</td>
<td>3,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10,052</td>
<td>1,747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRAPH 6**
HOMES IN FORECLOSURE AND HOMES EXITING FORECLOSURE VIA REO SALES IN IONIA COUNTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FORECLOSURES</th>
<th>REO SALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, the foreclosure crisis resulted in decreases in housing values. This decrease started in Grand Rapids and Detroit in 2006. The counties that report the Loan to Value Ratio (LTV) saw the ratio increase (Map 15). Prior to the decreases in housing prices, the LTV averaged between 82 and 86 percent, meaning that people owed about $82 for every $100 their house was worth. By 2007, the decreases in housing values increased the LTV into the 90s, and peaked around 96 percent in late 2009. This ratio slowly improved over 2010 as people current on their loans continued to pay down the balance and many of the loans that were foreclosed removed homes that were underwater.

It is important to note that the increase in LTV occurred prior to the second phase in the foreclosure crisis. This was a result of decrease in housing prices because of the first phase in the foreclosure crisis combined with a decrease in the population of Michigan. However, this left homeowners in Michigan vulnerable when the credit crisis hit in 2008 as they had little or no equity left in their homes. As a result the second phase of the foreclosure crisis was amplified.

This loss of equity is so severe that 11 of the 83 counties in Michigan have spent at least one month with a median LTV greater than 100 percent in 2009 or 2010. This means in those counties more than 50 percent of the loans were underwater during that month.

All 11 counties had a monthly percentage of houses in foreclosure for 2010 above the state average. It should be noted that fewer than 30 counties actually reported the LTV in the dataset which can be seen on the LTV map.

The foreclosure crisis is not just an urban phenomenon. Graphs 7 and 8 (on page 9) show the change in foreclosure rate in rural counties – defined as counties that have no urban center larger than 20,000 people and do not border a metropolitan area vs. urban – defined as all others. Rural areas saw their foreclosure rate triple over the six years (Maps 1-6) and at nearly 1.5 percent the ratio of houses in foreclosure in any given month was above the urban numbers from 2008. In addition, homeowners were getting into trouble in rural areas at nearly the same rate seen in urban areas in 2008 with more than four out of 100 loans at least 90 days late during an average month. Finally, the graphs suggest that although the rural areas had lower foreclosure rates compared to the urban areas and this gap grew larger over the six years of this study, the rural areas followed the same basic trend seen in the urban areas.

4 This report uses USDA-ERS classifications to measure rurality for counties in the United States. For more information see: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rurality
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Graph 7: Average Monthly Foreclosure Rate by County Type in Michigan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Rural Foreclosures</th>
<th>Urban Foreclosures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 8: Average Monthly Delinquency Rate by County Type in Michigan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Rural Delinquency</th>
<th>Urban Delinquency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The years 2005 to 2010 showed large increases in loans entering foreclosure. This increase began slowly and then accelerated after the financial meltdown in September 2008, which was the peak year for total houses entering foreclosure.

Over the course of these six years, foreclosures began on over 416,000 loans, which is nine percent of the housing stock. Wayne County was the hardest hit with over 35 percent of the foreclosure auction filings. The entry (or potential entry) of so many houses into the market contributed to large losses in housing value seen across Michigan, which has constrained local government revenues from property taxes. Finally, although the crisis was not as deep in rural counties, the percentage of houses in foreclosure still tripled over the six years of the study, and by 2010 stood above the 2008 numbers seen in other counties.

Citations


U.S. Census (2011). Housing vacancies Retrieved from 2000 and 2010 Census Summary File 1 – (Michigan) and provided by the Johnson Center’s Community Research Institute, Grand Valley State University.


Please direct any questions or feedback about this report to The Community Economic Development Association of Michigan (CEDAM) 517-485-3588 or email Neeta Delaney, Co-Director – Michigan Foreclosure Project at delaney@cedam.info or Steve Tobocman, Co-Director – Michigan Foreclosure Project at tobocman@cedam.info.
Map 1: Monthly Average of Mortgages in Foreclosure in 2005  Michigan Counties

Legend

- Monthly Average Percentage
  - Less than 0.75%
  - 0.75 to 1%
  - 1 to 1.3%

Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the monthly average of mortgages anywhere in the foreclosure process for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of foreclosures.)

Maps provided by: 2012 Johnson Center’s Community Research Institute, GVSU www.cridata.org
Map 2: Monthly Average of Mortgages in Foreclosure in 2006 Michigan Counties

Legend

Monthly Average Percentage

Less than 0.75%

0.75 to 1%

1 to 1.5%

1.5 to 1.6%

Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the monthly average of mortgages anywhere in the foreclosure process for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of foreclosures.)

Sources:

2005 - 2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
2012 Community Research Institute

Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South International Foot

Maps provided by:

2012 Johnson Center's Community Research Institute, GVSU
www.cridata.org
Map 3: Monthly Average of Mortgages in Foreclosure in 2007  Michigan Counties

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Average Percentage</th>
<th>Counties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 0.75%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75 to 1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 1.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 to 1.91%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Number in parenthesis is the monthly average of mortgages anywhere in the foreclosure process for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of foreclosures.)

Sources:
2005 - 2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
2012 Community Research Institute
Created on: February, 2012
Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South-International Feet
Maps provided by:
2012 Johnson Center’s Community Research Institute, GVSU
www.cridata.org
Map 4: Monthly Average of Mortgages in Foreclosure in 2008 Michigan Counties

Legend

- Less than 0.75%
- 0.75 to 1%
- 1 to 1.5%
- 1.5 to 1.96%
- Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the monthly average of mortgages anywhere in the foreclosure process for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of foreclosures.)

Sources:
2006 - 2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
2012 Community Research Institute
Created on: February, 2012
Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South-International Foot
Maps provided by:
2012 Johnson Center's Community Research Institute, GVSU
www.cridata.org
Map 5: Monthly Average of Mortgages in Foreclosure in 2009 Michigan Counties

Legend

Monthly Average Percentage

- Less than 0.75%
- 0.75 to 1%
- 1 to 1.5%
- 1.5 to 2%
- 2 to 3.4%

Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the monthly average of mortgages anywhere in the foreclosure process for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of foreclosures.)

Sources:
2005 - 2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
2012 Community Research Institute

Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South-International Feet
Maps provided by:
2012 Johnson Center’s Community Research Institute, GVSU
www.cridata.org
Map 6: Monthly Average of Mortgages in Foreclosure in 2010 Michigan Counties

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Average Percentage</th>
<th>Wisconsin</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 0.75%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75 to 1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 1.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 to 2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 4.45%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Number in parenthesis is the monthly average of mortgages anywhere in the foreclosure process for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of foreclosures)

Sources:
2005 - 2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
2012 Community Research Institute
Created on: February, 2012
Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South-International Feet
Maps provided by:
2012 Johnson Center's Community Research Institute, GVSU
www.cridata.org
Map 7: Monthly Average of Mortgages 90+ Days Late in 2005 Michigan Counties

Legend

- Monthly Average Percentage
  - Less than 2.5%
  - 2.5 to 5%
  - 5 to 5.6%
  - Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the average monthly total of mortgages 90+ Days Late for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of loans.)

Sources:
2005 - 2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
2012 Community Research Institute

Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South-International Feet
Maps provided by:
2012 Johnson Center's Community Research Institute, GVSU
www.cridata.org
Map 8: Monthly Average of Mortgages 90+ Days Late in 2006 Michigan Counties

Legend
Monthly Average Percentage
- Less than 2.5%
- 2.5 to 5%
- 5 to 7.2%
- Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the average monthly total of mortgages 90+ Days Late for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of loans)

Sources:
2005-2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
2012 Community Research Institute
Created on: February, 2012
Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South-International Feet
Maps provided by: 2012 Johnson Center's Community Research Institute, GVSU
www.cridata.org
Map 9: Monthly Average of Mortgages 90+ Days Late in 2007

Legend

Monthly Average Percentage

- Less than 2.5%
- 2.5 to 5%
- 5 to 7.5%
- 7.5 to 9.8%

Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the average monthly total of mortgages 90+ Days Late for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of loans.)

Sources:
- 2005 - 2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
- 2012 Community Research Institute

Created on: February, 2012
Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South-International Feet
Maps provided by:
- 2012 Johnson Center’s Community Research Institute, GVSU
- www.cridata.org
Map 10: Monthly Average of Mortgages 90+ Days Late in 2008 Michigan Counties

Legend

- **Less than 2.5%**
- 2.5 to 5%
- 5 to 7.5%
- 7.5 to 10%
- 10 to 11.3%
- Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the **average monthly total of mortgages 90+ Days Late for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of loans**)

**Sources:**
- 2005-2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
- 2012 Community Research Institute
- Created on: February, 2012
- Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South-International Feet
- Maps provided by: 2012 Johnson Center’s Community Research Institute, GVSU
- www.cridata.org
Map 11: Monthly Average of Mortgages 90+ Days Late in 2009 Michigan Counties

Legend

Monthly Average Percentage

- Less than 2.5%
- 2.5 to 5%
- 5 to 7.5%
- 7.5 to 10%
- 10 to 13.1%

Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the average monthly total of mortgages 90+ Days Late for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of loans)

Sources:
- 2005 - 2010 First American CoreLogic, Inc.
- 2012 Community Research Institute
- Created on: February, 2012
- Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83 South-International Feet
- Maps provided by:
  - 2012 Johnson Center’s Community Research Institute, GVSU
  - www.cridata.org

Illinois

- Lake (158)
- McHenry (205)
- Will (1,071)

Indiana

- Lake (1,249)
- Lake (324)
- Lake (376)
- Lake (168)
- Lake (133)

Ohio

- Lake (2,442)
- Lake (33,918)
- Lake (304)

Michigan Counties

- (Number in parenthesis is the average monthly total of mortgages 90+ Days Late for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of loans)
Map 12: Monthly Average of Mortgages 90+ Days Late in 2010 Michigan Counties

Legend

Monthly Average Percentage

- Less than 2.5%
- 2.5 to 5%
- 5 to 7.5%
- 7.5 to 10%
- 10 to 14.5%

Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the average monthly total of mortgages 90+ Days Late for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. has approx. 85% coverage of loans.)
Map 14: Percentage Change in Vacant Housing Units: 2000 to 2010 Michigan Counties

Legend

Percent Change
-4.4) to 0% (Decrease)
0 to 20% (Increase)
20 to 47.1 (Increase)
47.1 to 80% (Increase)
80 to 125.4% (Increase)

Great Lakes

Sources:
2010 U.S. Census Bureau - Decennial Census SF1
2012 Community Research Institute
Created on: February, 2012
Projection: U.S. State Plane NAD83
South-International Feet
Maps provided by:
2012 Johnson Center’s Community Research Institute, GVSU
www.cridata.org

Community Research Institute | Grand Valley State University
Map 15: Median Loan-to-Value Ratio in 2010

Legend

- 80% or less
- 81 to 94%
- 95 to 99%
- 100 to 106%
- Great Lakes

(Number in parenthesis is the mortgage debt to sales price ratio median for a given geography for the specified year. First American CoreLogic, Inc. dataset covers 65% to 70% of total market sales.)